The revised Courts and Tribunals Bill still raises serious questions about allocation, sentencing powers and legal aid.

The revised proposal

The Government’s announcement on 4 October 2026 that it would abandon judge-only trials for thousands of Crown Court cases was widely presented as a victory for the campaign to protect jury trial. The abandonment of the proposed “bench division” is welcome. However, the current Courts and Tribunals Bill 2026 still contains significant restrictions on access to jury trial and, for some defendants, may produce a worse outcome than the original proposal.

There is no absolute right to jury trial. Many offences—including common assault, threatening behaviour and assaulting a police officer—are tried only in the magistrates’ court. Although these offences may sit towards the lower end of the criminal calendar, a conviction can still have a devastating, career-ending effect. A teacher convicted of common assault, for example, may lose their job and face considerable difficulty working in the profession again.

Where the line is drawn

The legislative framework distinguishes between summary-only offences, which must be tried in the magistrates’ court, and either-way offences, which may be tried there or in the Crown Court. At present, a defendant charged with an either-way offence may elect trial by jury.

The original Bill would have removed that right. Cases expected to attract sentences of between one and three years’ imprisonment were to be allocated to the new Bench court, a Judge sitting without a jury. That proposal met substantial opposition and has now been abandoned.

Yet the Bill still proposes increasing magistrates’ sentencing powers to two years while removing the defendant’s right to elect Crown Court trial. Many cases (likely sentence 1 – 2 years imprisonment) previously destined for the proposed bench division will instead remain in the magistrates’ court.

The practical reach may be wider

In practice, magistrates and district judges may retain cases even where the eventual sentence could exceed their powers, particularly when the issues are straightforward. They may hear the case and commit the defendant to the Crown Court for sentence if a longer term proves necessary. The practical effect could therefore be that cases carrying sentences of up to about two and a half years remain in the magistrates’ court.

The revised scheme may consequently deny jury trial to defendants facing penalties close to those contemplated under the abandoned proposal. The institutional label changes; the erosion of election remains.

The legal-aid problem

For some defendants, the revised position could be worse. Crown Court means testing is comparatively generous: defendants with disposable income of up to £37,500 may qualify for legal aid, although they may have to contribute. Eligibility in the magistrates’ court is far more restrictive.

It will surprise many—perhaps even ministers—that a single person aged over 21, with no dependants and working 37.5 hours a week at the National Living Wage, does not qualify for magistrates’ court legal aid. A cohort of defendants who would have received legal aid for a judge-only trial in the proposed intermediate court may now receive none for a trial before a (district) judge in the magistrates’ court. That is hardly a victory for them.

Any measure directing increasingly serious cases from the Crown Court to the magistrates’ court must therefore be accompanied by a substantial increase in the magistrates’ court legal-aid eligibility thresholds.

Why election still matters

Defendants should be able to feel that they are being judged by their peers. That principle is not absolute, but its importance increases with the seriousness and consequences of the allegation. Defendants from ethnic-minority backgrounds may consider a local jury more representative than a bench of lay magistrates or a district judge. Protest cases, too, would frequently be determined without a jury even though they often involve wider issues and juries often acquit. The same concern arises for defendants of good character whose professional standing and reputation may be at stake.

A workable compromise

There is a respectable case for increasing magistrates’ sentencing powers as a means of easing pressure on the Crown Court. Lower-level drug-supply offences may attract an 18-month custodial sentence, sometimes suspended, following an early guilty plea; indecent-images offences can produce similar sentences. Such cases can often be handled efficiently in the magistrates’ court, and cases likely to attract between 12 months and two years could, if necessary, be reserved to district judges rather than lay magistrates for sentencing.

But efficiency cannot justify removing choice from the defendant. Increasing magistrates’ sentencing powers may be defensible; abolishing the right to elect jury trial is not. Any reform should preserve that right and ensure that defendants tried in the magistrates’ court have meaningful access to publicly funded representation.